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NO. 33 AUGUST 2018 Introduction 
Cambodia: The Winner Takes It All 
2018 Elections Set Country Firmly on Path towards Authoritarianism 
Chum Chandarin and Felix Heiduk 
There was never any doubt who would win Cambodia’s 2018 elections, with electoral 
politics skewed to favour Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). The CPP 
has already declared victory, claiming 76 per cent of votes and all of the 125 parlia-
mentary seats. The elections were condemned as a “sham” by the opposition after the 
dissolution of the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), the imprisonment of CNRP 
leader Kem Sokha, and a crackdown on civil society and the media. These events mark 
a watershed in Cambodian politics, indicating the establishment of a single-party 
autocracy backed by China. 
 
Since the early 1990s Cambodia’s national 
and local elections have been marred by 
vote buying, corruption, and tight govern-
ment control of the media. They have been 
considered to be not entirely free and cer-
tainly not fair. While the electoral process 
has always been skewed in favour of the 
ruling CPP under the leadership of Hun 
Sen, the dissolution of the opposition Cam-
bodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) marks 
a watershed. What we are now seeing in 
Cambodian politics is a transition from 
more than two decades of electoral authori-
tarianism – during which elections were 
never free and fair but still competitive – 
to a new period of one-party autocracy 
under the personalist leadership of Hun 
Sen. While Hun Sen declared that “the 
government will commit to protecting the 
multiparty democracy process” after the 
CNRP’s dissolution, it is clear that none of 
the twenty parties competing in the 2018 
elections stood a chance of challenging 
the CPP’s grip on power at the ballot box.  
So why did Hun Sen decide to de facto 
terminate electoral competition by dis-
solving the only viable opposition party? 
One important factor was paranoia over 
the threat of a Western-backed, CNRP-led 
“people power” movement. Another reason 
is found in the results of the last national 
elections in 2013, as well as the local elec-
tions in 2017. In 2013 the CNRP, founded in 
2012 as a merger of two opposition parties, 
increased its share of the vote to 44 percent, 
while the CPP’s support declined from 58 to 
49 percent. The CNRP rode a wave of urban 
and rural discontent over the perceived 
corruption of the Hun Sen government and 
the lack of trickle-down benefits from Cam-
bodia’s strong economic growth. The huge 
Chinese investments driving Cambodia’s 
economic boom have thus far largely bene-
fited Hun Sen’s associates and the country’s 
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small upper and upper-middle classes. 
On the other hand, parts of the popula-
tion have been negatively affected through 
phenomena such as the soaring cost of 
living in the cities and land-grabbing in 
rural areas. 
Consequently, local elections in the 
1,621 local authorities across the country 
saw the opposition grow from 2,955 coun-
cillors in 2012 to 5,007 in 2017. Those 
results also indicated that the CPP’s lead 
over the CNRP represented only about 7 
per cent of the popular vote. A survey con-
ducted in 2016 suggested that 44 percent 
planned to vote for the CNRP in 2018 and 
only 33 percent for the CPP. Some reports 
even suggested the CNRP might achieve 
as much as 53 percent in 2018 despite at-
tempts by the government to shape elec-
toral politics in favour of the ruling party. 
For the first time since the 1990s a change 
of government via competitive elections 
was deemed plausible. 
These developments created a situation 
where the ruling party became uncertain 
about its grip on power. To secure its regime, 
the CPP amended the legislation on politi-
cal parties, arrested the CNRP’s leader, and 
dissolved the party. The CPP now claimed 
all 125 parliamentary seats and controls 
over 95 percent of local councillors. 
Shrinking political space 
Along with the opposition party, Civil 
society organizations working on democ-
racy, human rights and/or election-related 
issues were also targeted with measures 
including the controversial new Law 
on Associations and Non-Governmental 
Organizations passed in 2015. The latter’s 
broad and vague definitions allow the gov-
ernment to take selectively legal action 
against vocal and critical groups if their 
actions are considered to threaten national 
security and stability. Similarly, independ-
ent media outlets that were previously plat-
forms where critics of the government and 
opposition parties could voice their opin-
ions and raise awareness on social issues 
such as land-grabbing, human trafficking, 
corruption and human rights violations 
came also under attack. The Cambodia Daily 
was closed down over a tax bill in Septem-
ber 2017, while the Phnom Penh Post was sold 
to a Malaysian PR firm with ties to the Cam-
bodian government. Its editor-in-chief was 
fired after publicizing the sale and reveal-
ing the new ownership. Radio Free Asia 
was forced to close its Phnom Penh office, 
and more than thirty local radio stations 
were ordered to stop relaying RFA/Voice of 
America programmes or face legal repercus-
sions. Social networks like Facebook have 
also come under scrutiny: In May 2018 the 
interior, post and telecommunication, and 
information ministries created a joint work-
ing group to investigate any public post or 
comment they believe threatens the ruling 
party. A number of Cambodians have al-
ready been arrested for comments on Face-
book that the government believe threaten 
social stability. 
Table 1 
Political parties and their votes in recent elections 
 
Political party 
National election 2013 
CPP CNRP Others 
Local elections 2017 
CPP CNRP Others 
Number of votes 3,235,969 2,946,176 445,014 3,540,056 3,056,824 377,031 
Vote as % 48.83 44.46 6.71 50.76 43.83 5.41 
Representatives 68 55 0 6,503 5,007 62 
At the time of publication the official election results for the 2018 elections had not yet been published. 
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In recent years Hun Sen has also tight-
ened his grip on power within the state. 
Today Cambodia is essentially a one-party 
state with Hun Sen as its undisputed leader. 
Not only has Hun Sen cracked down on 
civil society and the media and outlawed 
the major opposition party; he has come 
to dominate Cambodian politics to such 
an extent that the CPP and the bureaucracy 
have become secondary institutions. In a 
strategy of personalised rule, Hun Sen not 
only dominates the CPP, but has also taken 
control of the bureaucracy and the army 
and police chains of command by appoint-
ing relatives and close aides to key posi-
tions. He has also built up his own para-
military security force outside the formal 
chain of command. As such, Hun Sen has 
set Cambodian politics on a fast track to a 
one-party autocracy. 
Diplomatic shifts: China 
The domestic political clampdown has been 
accompanied by a diplomatic shift. Western 
donors, perceived by Hun Sen as too intru-
sive, have increasingly been supplanted by 
no-strings-attached Chinese support. For 
almost a quarter of a century the United 
States, European countries, Australia and 
other donors have helped to rebuild war-
torn Cambodia after the defeat of the geno-
cidal Khmer Rouge regime. Billions of 
dollars have been invested to transform 
Cambodia into a liberal democracy. Since 
1993, however, Hun Sen’s CPP has largely 
controlled Cambodian politics in semi-
authoritarian fashion. The CPP held regular 
elections with Western support, but the 
opposition never stood a chance of winning 
due to extensive fraud, intimidation, and 
lack of funding. Criticism of Cambodia’s 
electoral authoritarianism by Western 
donors led Hun Sen to employ an increas-
ingly anti-Western narrative, condemning 
Western powers for meddling in Cam-
bodia’s internal affairs and treating it as a 
pawn in a geopolitical game against China. 
As a result, Cambodia has increasingly 
aligned itself diplomatically (as well as mili-
tarily and economically) with China. China 
has supplied loans and aid without con-
ditions concerning human rights or the rule 
of law. Between 2016 and 2017 there were 
more than a dozen state visits by senior 
Chinese leaders, including Xi Jinping in 
October 2016. The Chinese leadership has 
repeatedly praised Hun Sen’s leadership 
and assured him of their unwavering sup-
port. Hun Sen in return praised China 
as Cambodia’s most trustworthy friend. 
The two countries have signed a number 
of agreements to create special economic 
zones, increase the number of Chinese 
tourists, and implement One Belt One Road 
plans in Cambodia. Over half of all foreign 
direct investment in Cambodia in 2016 
came from China. Much of Cambodia’s 
consistently strong economic growth (over 
6 percent annually) is driven by Chinese in-
vestments in infrastructure and industry as 
well by Chinese tourism. Beijing has also 
provided millions of dollars worth of mili-
tary aid in recent years, donating military 
vehicles and uniforms, tanks, patrol boats, 
assault rifles and helping to build military 
training facilities. Cambodia in turn has 
lent its support to various Chinese foreign 
policy initiatives, for example repeatedly 
watering down ASEAN communiqués ad-
dressing China’s territorial ambitions in the 
South China Sea. Other ASEAN states have 
accused Cambodia of undermining regional 
cooperation on behalf of China. Diplomati-
cally, Cambodia’s descent into authoritar-
ianism also reflects a perception in the 
region that the United States, and to a lesser 
extent Europe, have withdrawn, leaving the 
field to China. 
Europe needs to send a 
strong message 
If Cambodia’s transition to authoritarian-
ism proceeds smoothly domestically and 
internationally, this could send a message 
to other autocracies in waiting in the region 
and beyond. The lesson from Cambodia 
being that it is possible to make the change 
to authoritarian rule with very few political 
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and economic costs if you have China’s 
backing, while criticism from Europe 
remains just words. If Cambodia’s transi-
tion to dictatorship were to be successful, 
other states in the region could see this as 
a path to follow. So a strong reaction from 
Brussels is crucial. Already some European 
investors have been put off by endemic 
corruption, not to mention the shrill anti-
Western rhetoric. In the wake of the recent 
crackdown, diplomatic ties between Cam-
bodia and numerous donor countries have 
further weakened. The Trump administra-
tion has cut aid to Cambodia, imposed visa 
restrictions on top officials and cancelled 
all funds earmarked for supporting July’s 
national election. Japan withdrew its elec-
tion observers. The European Union also 
withdrew its election observers and sus-
pended financial assistance to the Cam-
bodian National Election Committee. Brus-
sels has also been reviewing Cambodia’s 
eligibility for the Generalised Scheme of 
Preferences (GSP) agreement, which grants 
tariff-free access to the European market 
under the “Everything But Arms” (EBA) 
scheme. Cambodia is the second-biggest 
beneficiary of EBA after Bangladesh, ac-
counting for 18 percent of all EBA imports 
to the EU, which is the destination for over 
40 percent of its apparel exports. While 
China can curry favour with unconditional 
aids and loans, it cannot replace the gar-
ment and textile export markets in the 
United States and Europe. 61.1 percent of 
Cambodia’s $10.1 billion in exports went 
to the EU and United States in 2016, while 
China accounted for only 6 percent. Over 
one million jobs in Cambodia depend on 
the export sector (largely garments). Ac-
cording to a recent report by Moody’s Inves-
tors Service, dependency on EU and US 
markets make the Cambodian economy 
vulnerable to “shocks”. The lack of export 
diversification provides Europe with a 
degree of leverage. 
In the aftermath of the election, the 
European Union needs to send a strong 
message. Its review of Cambodia’s inclusion 
in the EBA scheme needs to be completed 
quickly. Leading Cambodian government 
officials should face visa sanctions and the 
freezing of their foreign financial assets. 
The EU, whose market is the destination 
for a significant proportion of Cambodia’s 
exports, should seriously consider denying 
tariff-free access. Under the GSP agreement 
tariff preferences could be withdrawn tem-
porarily or permanently in response to the 
government crackdown on the opposition 
prior to the elections. 
Most importantly, Brussels and EU mem-
ber states should call out Cambodia’s elec-
tions for what they are: democratic window 
dressing of an increasingly autocratic regime. 
Unless democracy is restored in line with 
the Paris Peace Accords signed by Cambo-
dia’s warring factions in 1991 after decades 
of civil war, European government would 
be well advised to move from threatening 
sanctions to implementing them. 
Chum Chandarin is a Visiting Fellow and Dr. Felix Heiduk is a Senior Associate in SWP’s Asia Division. 
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